From Annual Report Singing Waves no. 28, 1999-2000
TBML-College, Porayar.



THE PERIOD OF CRISIS AND THE QUESTION OF SURVIVAL AT THE DANISH 
SETTLEMENT OF TRANQUEBAR 1643 - 1969

Dr. Jothi Packiam, 
Reader in History.


With the hope of getting a share of the riches of the east, at the beginning of the 17th century various European countries formed East India companies and established maritime trade with India. It was an ambitious dream of Christian IV, the King of Denmark, to make Denmark a leading trading nation. His ambitious dream became a reality when two immigrant Dutch merchants came forward and established the Danish East India Company at Denmark in 1616 and it was given twelve years monopoly on trade by a Royal charter.

Four years after the establishment of the Danish East India Company a Danish trade settlement was established at Tranquebar, Denmark's first overseas possession, In 1620 by the efforts of the Danish Admiral Ove Giedde and a Holland captain Roeland Crappe. They obtained permission from the Nayak Ragunatha of Tanjore to establish a fortified station and they erected a fortress at the beach of Tranquebar and named it "Dansborg" In return they would pay an annual fee and undertake trade with the native people. 

In the first 20 years the Danish excelled in their new adventure. Up to 1625 one or two company ships used to reach Tranquebar from Copenhagen annually. As Denmark was still predominantly an agricultural country, the number of ships reaching Tranquebar dwindled even since 1625 due to lack of capital in Copenhagen. 'Christianshavn' the Danish East India company's ship reached Tranquebar in 1643; There was an undue long gap of nearly three decades after which the ship 'Faero' bound for Tranquebar anchored in 1669. During this gap of 26 years no communication could be established between Tranquebar and Copenhagen and the working relation between the two were temporarily cut
off.

The circumstances leading to this peculiar and changed situation which prevai1ed during the period under discussion was due to Thirty years war in Europe (1618 - 48). Christian IV involved Denmark in the war in 1625. Due to this changed situation and the unexpected demand on the warfront, the economy of Denmark suffered a set back and the 
treasury was depleted. Because of this economic strangulation Denmark could not afford to spare a trading ship to Tranquebar any more. The situation was so precarious that no new slips cou1d be added to the fleet nor was it possible to equip slips by the war battered Denmark. As a consequence of these factors there was a gap of 26 years in sea 
transport between Denmark and Tranquebar. The preoccupations in European politics and resultant economic disavantages in Denmark caused the shadow on the company affairs at Tranquebar. The company trading activities at Tranquebar were paralysed severely affecting the finance and the personnel to a very great extent.

Another factor a1so operated against the colonial prospects of the Danish East India company during the said period. Taking advantage of the prevailing situation the Dutch consolidated their position on the coromandel coast in a significant manner and gained more influence in the realm of maritime trade (via madacascar) around 1642 at the cost of 
Danish commercial interests.

It will be more interesting and a1so necessary to discuss the parallel situation which prevailed during the same period in Tamil Nadu. The Nayak of Tanjore was a1so in a state of financial crisis. The Chenji and Madura Nayaks who were hostile towards the Nayak ofTanjore induced Golconda to invade Tanjore. During the course of the endemic war Tanjore was defeated and looted between 1616 and 1618 respectively by Go1conda and Bijapur sultans which led to the financial crisis in Tanjore. Compelled by this new situation the Nayak of Tanjore had to demand and extract the arrears from the Danes and the inhabitants of the Danish settlement by military means. Under this situation the commandants had to maintain the fort for the king. The commandant was bound by an agreement to hold the fort and the town even if the company was dissolved or if the company did not send out ships for a period of time. 
The company officials in Tranquebar were sandwitched between the crisis in Denmark and the crisis to the Nayak. Literally they fauna themselves between the devil and the deep sea. Naturally the survival instinct asserted itself and a activated and motivated survival instinct asserted itself. The hapless and forlorn company personne1 had to overcome the accumulated crisis.

Hard pressed by the economic bankruptcy and survival question the company personnel in Tranquebar were ab1e to offer various kinds of services to the European powers, the Dutch and the Portuguese. The rivalry between the Dutch and the Portuguese in India during the first half of the 17th century had offered a certain amount of trade opportunities to neutral Tranquebar. When the Dutch and the Portuguese waged war with each other, both were interested in using 
Tranquebar ships because their neutral flag cou1d protect trade during war. The Danes did not take side during the war and maintained neutrality. The Dutch found it advantageous to collect their textiles under the guns of Dansborg and pay one percent of the value of the goods for their transportation. So the European powers used the neutral Danes 
to transport their goods under the over of the Danish flag. The enterprising and industrious Danes took advantage of this situation and were able to fulfil the commercial needs of the Dutch and the Portuguese simultaneously and earned greater revenue and thereby augmented their financial resources. 

Another important avenue of income to the Danes during this period was through piracy. A round 1640 some Danish ships lay stranded on the coast of Bengal near Pipely, The local authorities instead of coming to the rescue of the Danes, acted otherwise and even refused to handover the goods of the stranded ships. This highhanded actions of the locals were more heinous than piracy and this became the ground of justification for them to adopt piracy as a method of earning revenue and compensating their lasso. Hence the Danish ships cruized in the Bay of Bengal regularly and seized Beingal ships and cargoes. Through this questionable traffic the Danes were able to raise not only considerable sums of money for the upkeep of Tranquebar and its trade but also it provided them with ships for their trade and warfare. Though the mughal authorities in Bengal were furious about the Danish piracy they were unable to react and retaliate directly as they had no armed ships. Thus piracy provided the company at Tranquebar with money for their survival 
and to tide over the crisis.


When this crisis management at Tranquebar was going on thus, some interesting and exciting developments were taking place in Denmark. Severely bitten by the financial crisis, the king of Denmark was making serious efforts to sell Tranquebar. Actually the king sold the settlement of Tranquebar and two adjacent villages to the Elector of Brandenberg in 1651. As he did not make payment, the king started negotiations for sale with the Dutch and the English. It is strange to not that none of these developments was known to the Danish commandants at Tranquebar. They were completely oblivious of these developments and literally they were under total darkness.

The Dutch, finding that the fort of Tranquebar was strong, tried to purchase or get it for lease as an alternative to the Dutch fort 'Geldria' in Pulicat. And with the same purpose and intention they lent military personnel to beef up the garrison of Dansborg which had in 1650 dwindled to a few Danes. This support extended by the Dutch was really a blessing in disguise for Tranquebar to continue to remain a Danish settlement.


The commandants of Tranquebar not knowing that the king was making serious efforts to sell Tranquebar, did their best to remain loyal to the promise and undertaking given to the king at the time of the formation of the company to protect and maintain the fort for the king in spite of heavy odds.


If one observes the developments during this period one would definitely understand that ill time and misfortune had befallen informally on the three entities namely the king of Denmark, the commandant of Tranquebar and the Nayak of Tanjore resulting in a triangular crisis and the worst affected of all was no doubt the company officials at Tranquebar.


At this juncture a peculiar unforeseen and unexpected development took place leading to leadership and administrative crisis in the company administration at Tranquebar. In the year 1655 it so happened that Paul Hansen, the Governor of Tranquebar died without naming his successor which created a vacuum at the helm of affairs leading to serious snag in 
the administration. Since communication could not be established with Copenhagen for consultation for solving the succession crisis, the soldiers and the local people of Tranquebar elected Eskild Andersen as 
Governor of Tranquebar, a constable who came along with Leyel in 1643. Though it was socially demeaning to seek a governor in this way, it proved to be the right choice. It was due to the efforts of Eskild Andersen that the fort and the town were kept in the Danish hands. In spite of the tempting offers from the Dutch neither Paul Hensen nor Eskild Andersen were willing to give up the fort without the express command of their king. Thus the constable-Governor rose to the occasion and did not belie the hope and expectations of the soldiers and the public who elected him. He carried on the administration in an exemplary way to the best of his ability and fullest satisfaction of the people who elected him. It should be known that he was in no way less calibre and in administrative acumen compared to any of his predecessors at Tranquebar. Nowhere in the Danish colonial history we can find a parallel to this incident of a constable, a pensonne1 in the lowest rung of the administration, all on a sudden put on the pedestal of the highest gubernatorial post of Governor and the constable governor proving his mettle at the apex of the administrative set up.

Thus it may be concluded that in the triangular crisis discussed above, the company personnel had played their roles adequately and responded to the challenges remarkably and valiantly which proved their loyalty to the king to hold on the settlement at least up to 1845 despite great trials and tribulations right from the very inception of the company,


REFERENCES

Uno Barner Jensen, Danish East India: trade coins 1620 -1845 Denmark, 1997.

Ole Feldback, India Trade under the Danish Flag 1772 -1808 Denmark, 1969.

Nagasamy, Tharangampadi, Madras; 1987.

Roderich ptak & Dietmar Rothermund (ed), Emporia, commodities and entrepreneurs in Asian maritime trade, C. 1400 -1750.

Ole Feldback, "The Danish'trading companies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries", The Scandinavian Economic History Review, 1986. 

Kenneth Beilhatchet & David Taylot(eds) changing south Asia: city and cu1ture, Hongkong, 1984.

Gensichen, Tranquebar: Then and Now, Madras.

Jothipackiam, Danish Trading enterprise in Tranquebar (Article)

Martin Kriegar, Danish Trade on the Indian Ocean (article)

Maersk Air magazine, summer 1994.


Webmaster & Information.

Designer: BC